Criticism
noun
1 an expression of disapproval based on perceived faults or mistakes
2 the analysis and judgment of the merits and faults of a literary or artistic work
ORIGIN early 17th cent.: from critic or Latin criticus + -ism .
There are two things of note here:
1. The illusory division of professional (or academic) criticism
from the pronouncement of disapproval at its etymological base.
2. From the ORIGIN, Criticism is the act or method of the Critic
Critic
noun
1 a person who expresses an unfavorable opinion of something
2 a person who judges the merits of literary, artistic, or musical works,
esp. one who does so professionally
ORIGIN late 16th cent.: from Latin criticus, from Greek kritikos ‘able to discern’, from kritēs ‘a judge,’ from krinein ‘judge, decide, separate.’
Now the import of our earlier divide becomes clear, for:
If a critic is “a person who expresses an unfavorable opinion of something,”
than the critic is defined by the party which they oppose,
(those who would deem the criticism unfavorable)
which is to say,
the Critic comes-into-being only in opposition to an existing idea.
However,
There are some who would debate this claim,
argue that criticism need not necessitate opposition,
argue that the critic need not oppose anything,
only as Milan Kundera said, “discover discoveries.”
This is where the etymology comes in.
At the root of Critic is Krinein, to judge, decide, separate.
Which is to say,
there is an inherent divisiveness at play in the Critic,
for there is an inherent divisiveness in all judgment,
every declaration of value stands in opposition to its other
this is the nature of Krinein, the judgment as separation.
Thus, the academic critic,
in defining itself apart from the adversarial definition at its root,
politely avoids stepping on anyone’s toes
and so, fails to truly criticize anything.
Critical Theory
Critical Theory is the systemic foundation of (the above) opposition.
This naturally puts Critical Theory in line with Dialectics,
wherein thesis is opposed by antithesis, resulting in synthesis.
This synthesis thus becomes thesis again, and so on and so forth.
The opposition of the Critic is thus,
in a way, an engagement with a temporal order,
a testament to an ever-evolving record of overcoming (strife).
And this works for thousands of years.
Then something strange happens.
Modernity produces a break with the continuum of Western Thought.
Certain precepts which had hitherto been untouchable ideals
are brought into question by new schools of philosophy, art, and criticism.
Suddenly,
God is up for reconsideration, and with it, any static notions of Truth.
No longer can the critic make value judgments
for notions of value are made obsolete in the rising awareness of
Subjectivity.
One way of thinking about this is that Modernity saw the (re)emergence of Nihilism,
(wherein all being contends with its own negation)
and as such,
the critic’s judgment faces negation even as it seeks to undermine its opposition.
This is a deeply unstable process,
and that instability becomes the trademark of much of postmodern thinking.
